Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation

Arthur J. Dyck
The Journal of Religious Ethics
Vol. 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 37-52
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40016696
Page Count: 16
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($39.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation
Preview not available

Abstract

Contemporary moral philosophy tends to equate what is moral with what is obligatory. Hence, there is a tendency to exclude all virtues from what is moral because they are dispositions other than the one morally good disposition to fulfill obligations out of a sense of obligation. This has the effect of excluding much of what we admire about persons from moral philosophy and from the moral life. This essay argues that there are at least two virtues, both forms of love, moral perceptivity and moral tenacity, which are moral and obligatory. The author explores some of the relationships of these two moral virtues to the traditional theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, and to heroism and saintliness.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[37]
    [37]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
38
    38
  • Thumbnail: Page 
39
    39
  • Thumbnail: Page 
40
    40
  • Thumbnail: Page 
41
    41
  • Thumbnail: Page 
42
    42
  • Thumbnail: Page 
43
    43
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51
  • Thumbnail: Page 
52
    52