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A Kierkegaardian Approach to Moral Philosophy: The Process of Moral Decision-Making
Virginia L. Warren
The Journal of Religious Ethics
Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1982), pp. 221-237
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40017769
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Morality, Ethics, Normative ethics, Religious ethics, Thought, Moral principles, Moral particularism, Objective knowledge, Moral knowledge, Normativity
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A more complete methodology for normative ethics is needed, and Kierkegaard's philosophy, which emphasizes the individual's role in moral decision-making, can help to meet this need. This essay discusses two ways in which Kierkegaard sought to expand a commonly accepted conception of morality. First, he stressed that the agent changes as part of the process of moral decision-making, with personal experience and insight integral parts of that process. Second, Kierkegaard included within the realm of morality decisions (e.g., about occupation) which are normally viewed as simply matters of personal preference.
The Journal of Religious Ethics © 1982 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc