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The Positive Value of Evil
Jane Mary Trau
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Vol. 24, No. 1/2, The Problem of Evil (Jul. - Sep., 1988), pp. 21-33
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40024792
Page Count: 13
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The argument from evil claims that the proposition 'God exists' is incompatible with the proposition 'Evil exists'. One response to the argument is to show that there is a third proposition which is consistent with the first, and whose conjunction with the first implies the second, thereby showing that the first and second propositions are compatible. I propose that this third proposition is 'Evil has positive value'. This third proposition is established by the development of a meta-ethical theory, viz., the theory of positive value. The purpose of this paper is to develop this theory and apply it to the existence of evil.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion © 1988 Springer