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The Positive Value of Evil

Jane Mary Trau
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Vol. 24, No. 1/2, The Problem of Evil (Jul. - Sep., 1988), pp. 21-33
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40024792
Page Count: 13
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The Positive Value of Evil
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Abstract

The argument from evil claims that the proposition 'God exists' is incompatible with the proposition 'Evil exists'. One response to the argument is to show that there is a third proposition which is consistent with the first, and whose conjunction with the first implies the second, thereby showing that the first and second propositions are compatible. I propose that this third proposition is 'Evil has positive value'. This third proposition is established by the development of a meta-ethical theory, viz., the theory of positive value. The purpose of this paper is to develop this theory and apply it to the existence of evil.

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