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Rule-Following and Externalism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 127-140
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040662
Page Count: 14
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John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2004 International Phenomenological Society