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Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jul., 2004), pp. 138-155
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040706
Page Count: 18
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Skepticism, Economic discrimination, Pragmatics, Contextualism, Hyperbole, Ascriptions, Epistemic pluralism, Semantics, Implicature, Linguistics
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The skeptic says that "knowledge" is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that 'knowledge" is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about "knowledge"? And what implications do these hypotheses about "knowledge" have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about "knowledge", but that both hypotheses about "knowledge" have deeply anti-skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2004 International Phenomenological Society