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The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 69, No. 2 (Sep., 2004), pp. 411-422
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040728
Page Count: 12
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Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2004 International Phenomenological Society