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Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 71, No. 2 (Sep., 2005), pp. 367-383
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Justified beliefs, Belief, Internalism, Truth, Disjunctivism, Epistemic justification, Relevant alternatives, Epistemology, Skepticism, Phenomenology
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In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a "highest common factor" between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where "warrant" is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge).
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2005 International Phenomenological Society