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What You Don't Know Can't Help You: Pension Knowledge and Retirement Decision-Making
Sewin Chan and Ann Huff Stevens
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. 90, No. 2 (May, 2008), pp. 253-266
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40043144
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Pension plans, Retirement, Retirement age, Defined benefit pension plan, Employee pension plans, Age, Old age benefits, Private pensions, Self reports, Retirement income
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This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives and document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual. Ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their own misperceptions of pension incentives.
The Review of Economics and Statistics © 2008 The MIT Press