Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Excessive Labour Raiding

Bryan C. McCannon
Economica
New Series, Vol. 75, No. 297 (Feb., 2008), pp. 140-147
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071734
Page Count: 8
  • Download ($43.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Excessive Labour Raiding
Preview not available

Abstract

Labour raiding refers to firms recruiting and hiring employed workers. The literature on labour raiding supports the idea that raiding sorts workers into their most productive positions. I present a model where an outside firm decides whether or not to pay to learn the match-quality of an employed worker and the employer decides whether or not to pay its worker a high wage that pre-empts the raiding. I show that the employer may pay a low wage and gamble that it will not be raided rather than use a pre-emptive wage. This leads to an excessive amount of raiding.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[140]
    [140]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
141
    141
  • Thumbnail: Page 
142
    142
  • Thumbnail: Page 
143
    143
  • Thumbnail: Page 
144
    144
  • Thumbnail: Page 
145
    145
  • Thumbnail: Page 
146
    146
  • Thumbnail: Page 
147
    147