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Deregulation and Privatization in Germany

Ingo Vogelsang
Journal of Public Policy
Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1988), pp. 195-212
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007205
Page Count: 18
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Abstract

Public enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany are about average for all nonsocialist countries and markets are more heavily regulated than in the United States. Compared to American deregulation and British privatization, there have been few developments in the Federal Republic. Why? In the last ten years new schools of thought have provided a stronger normative foundation for and a stronger positive explanation against deregulation and privatization in Germany in the near future. The German political debate on deregulation and privatization is characterized by three institutional peculiarities. Major steps to deregulate or privatize economic sectors require legislation, which is influenced by political parties. Trade unions exert a strong influence on the major parties and are opposed to privatization and deregulation. The European Community forces some deregulation upon the Federal Republic in order to liberalize service sectors.

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