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Journal Article

Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism

Joseph Melia
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 50, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 639-664
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072260
Page Count: 26
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Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism
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Abstract

In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception of determinism that is both independently plausible and capable of blocking the hole argument.

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