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Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa and Tommaso Mastropasqua
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 201-211
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072277
Page Count: 11
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Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]
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Abstract

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

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