Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Biología e innatismo: Algunos comentarios críticos (Biology and Innateness: Some Critical Comments)

Claudia Lorena García
Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
Vol. 35, No. 104 (Aug., 2003), pp. 3-30
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40104909
Page Count: 28
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Biología e innatismo: Algunos comentarios críticos (Biology and Innateness: Some Critical Comments)
Preview not available

Abstract

En el presente artículo argumento que algunos de los descubrimientos empíricos relativamente recientes en la biología del desarrollo nos llevan a abandonar ciertos conceptos de lo innato, en particular, aquellos que llamaremos 'internistas'. También examino la adecuación de tres caracterizaciones de lo innato propuestas recientemente que toman en cuenta los descubrimientos empíricos antes mencionados y pretenden recoger un núcleo importante de las connotaciones y afirmaciones asociadas a lo innato en algunas disciplinas empíricas. Además, argumento que dos de estas caracterizaciones son inadecuadas por razones diversas, y que es más plausible considerar la tercera como una explicación del concepto de un rasgo fenotípico heredado. /// In this paper I argue that some relatively recent empirical findings in developmental biology lead us to abandon some concepts of innateness, in particular those which we shall call 'internalist concepts'. I also examine three characterizations of innateness that have been recently proposed--characterizations which take into account those empirical findings and are attempts to explain some of the most important connotations and assertions associated to the word 'innate' as it is used in some empirical disciplines. It is also argued that two of these characterizations are inadequate for various reasons, and that it is more plausible to consider the third characterization as an explication of the concept of an inherited phenotypic trait.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[3]
    [3]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
4
    4
  • Thumbnail: Page 
5
    5
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11
  • Thumbnail: Page 
12
    12
  • Thumbnail: Page 
13
    13
  • Thumbnail: Page 
14
    14
  • Thumbnail: Page 
15
    15
  • Thumbnail: Page 
16
    16
  • Thumbnail: Page 
17
    17
  • Thumbnail: Page 
18
    18
  • Thumbnail: Page 
19
    19
  • Thumbnail: Page 
20
    20
  • Thumbnail: Page 
21
    21
  • Thumbnail: Page 
22
    22
  • Thumbnail: Page 
23
    23
  • Thumbnail: Page 
24
    24
  • Thumbnail: Page 
25
    25
  • Thumbnail: Page 
26
    26
  • Thumbnail: Page 
27
    27
  • Thumbnail: Page 
28
    28
  • Thumbnail: Page 
29
    29
  • Thumbnail: Page 
30
    30