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Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 59, No. 235 (Apr., 2009), pp. 237-251
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208598
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Ontological luck, Compatibilism, Endowments, Libertarianism, Moral responsibility, Free will, Modal realism, Historical accounts, Indeterminism, Intuition
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Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one Kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote -- constitutive -- luck.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2009 Oxford University Press