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A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 59, No. 235 (Apr., 2009), pp. 315-324
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208602
Page Count: 10
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One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2009 Oxford University Press