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Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 59, No. 236 (Jul., 2009), pp. 508-518
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208623
Page Count: 11
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John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural-kind properties, such as being a tomato.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2009 Oxford University Press