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Brogaard's Moral Contextualism

Lars Binderup
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 58, No. 232 (Jul., 2008), pp. 410-415
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208634
Page Count: 6
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Brogaard's Moral Contextualism
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Abstract

Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims. The moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about the semantic workings of their own language. But, secondly, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism looking weaker than a Mache-style invariantist error theory about morals. The latter is equally non-objectivist, but less revisionist, since it takes the semantics of moral discourse at face value, and can also explain all of Brogaard's other linguistic evidence.

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