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Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 58, No. 232 (Jul., 2008), pp. 448-456
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208637
Page Count: 9
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Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism
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Abstract

This précis summarizes my book 'Moral Skepticisms', with emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers.

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