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The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 58, No. 232 (Jul., 2008), pp. 512-518
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208643
Page Count: 7
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Intrinsic properties, Property law, Philosophical object, Legal dispositions, Legal objections, Intellectual property law, Philosophical analysis, Contrafactuals, Joint ownership, Sufficient conditions
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Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2008 Oxford University Press