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Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 58, No. 233 (Oct., 2008), pp. 630-641
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208664
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Intentional action, Normativity, Blame, Side effects, Judgment, Moral judgment, Motivation, Reasoning, Moral responsibility, Morality
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Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has a normative component. I propose a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect. This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action. The praise--blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2008 Oxford University Press