Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry

Frank Hindriks
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 58, No. 233 (Oct., 2008), pp. 630-641
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208664
Page Count: 12
  • Get Access
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry
Preview not available

Abstract

Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has a normative component. I propose a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect. This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action. The praise--blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[630]
    [630]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
631
    631
  • Thumbnail: Page 
632
    632
  • Thumbnail: Page 
633
    633
  • Thumbnail: Page 
634
    634
  • Thumbnail: Page 
635
    635
  • Thumbnail: Page 
636
    636
  • Thumbnail: Page 
637
    637
  • Thumbnail: Page 
638
    638
  • Thumbnail: Page 
639
    639
  • Thumbnail: Page 
640
    640
  • Thumbnail: Page 
641
    641