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Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge

T. Parent
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 133, No. 3 (Apr., 2007), pp. 411-424
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208687
Page Count: 14
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Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge
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Abstract

Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are "in the head;" thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts.

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