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Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning

Peter Klein
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 134, No. 1, Proceedings of the 2004 Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy (May, 2007), pp. 1-17
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208695
Page Count: 17
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Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism--the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating--solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, I want to present the infinitist solution to the problem and defend it against some of the well known objections to it.

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