If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Three Questions about Leplin's Reliabilism

David Christensen
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 134, No. 1, Proceedings of the 2004 Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy (May, 2007), pp. 43-50
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208699
Page Count: 8
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Three Questions about Leplin's Reliabilism
Preview not available

Abstract

Jarrett Leplin's paper is multifaceted; it's rich with ideas, and I won't even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I'd like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[43]
    [43]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50