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Review: Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment

Reviewed Work: Theories of Judgment by Wayne Martin
Review by: R. Lanier Anderson
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 137, No. 1, Selected Papers from the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2007 Meeting (Jan., 2008), pp. 91-108
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208782
Page Count: 18
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Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment
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Abstract

Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)--criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments, which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of "thetic" judgments, whose essential feature is to "posit" something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant's official definition of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality actually affords Kant's own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory. Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant's larger aims in the theory of cognition.

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