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Review: Wayne Martin on Judgment

Reviewed Work: Theories of Judgment by Wayne Martin
Review by: Hans Sluga
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 137, No. 1, Selected Papers from the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2007 Meeting (Jan., 2008), pp. 109-119
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208783
Page Count: 11
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Wayne Martin on Judgment
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Abstract

Wayne Martin's Theories of Judgment marks a significant advance in the philosophical analysis of judgment. He understands that the domain of judgment is so large that it allows only a selective treatment. We can expand Martin's insight by acknowledging that this domain is, in fact, hypercomplex and therefore unsurveyable in Wittgenstein's sense. Martin's treatment of judgments can, however, be extended in a number of directions. Of particular importance is it to understand the linguistic aspect of theoretical judgments, the challenges to the synthetic conception of judgment constituted not only by existential, but also by impersonal and negative judgments, and the exploration of the links between the notions of judgment and truth.

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