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Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief

Andrew Reisner
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 138, No. 1 (Mar., 2008), pp. 17-27
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208857
Page Count: 11
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Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a 'defeasing function'. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.

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