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Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 138, No. 2 (Mar., 2008), pp. 151-160
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208865
Page Count: 10
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The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen's "Modal Fictionalism'. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension -- and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2008 Springer