Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 138, No. 2 (Mar., 2008), pp. 151-160
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208865
Page Count: 10
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse
Preview not available

Abstract

The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen's "Modal Fictionalism'. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension -- and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[151]
    [151]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
152
    152
  • Thumbnail: Page 
153
    153
  • Thumbnail: Page 
154
    154
  • Thumbnail: Page 
155
    155
  • Thumbnail: Page 
156
    156
  • Thumbnail: Page 
157
    157
  • Thumbnail: Page 
158
    158
  • Thumbnail: Page 
159
    159
  • Thumbnail: Page 
160
    160