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Mental Causation as Multiple Causation

Thomas Kroedel
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 139, No. 1 (May, 2008), pp. 125-143
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208895
Page Count: 19
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Mental Causation as Multiple Causation
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Abstract

The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of mental causation is consistent with the overdetermination of physical events by mental events and other physical events, but does not entail it.

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