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The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

John Turri
Noûs
Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep., 2009), pp. 490-512
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40267352
Page Count: 23
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The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons
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Abstract

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or nonmental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.

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