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On the Proximity of the Logical and 'Objective Bayesian' Interpretations of Probability
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Vol. 69, No. 3 (Nov., 2008), pp. 335-349
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40267395
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Ambivalence, Bayesian theories, Bayesian epistemology, Intuition, Entailment, Entropy, Betting, Abstract entities, Empiricism, Philosophy of science
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In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an 'Objective Bayesian' interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and 'Objective Bayesian' views, and show how, and why, they are highly similar. Second, I argue that the logical interpretation is not manifestly inferior, at least for the reasons that Williamson offers. I suggest that the key difference between the logical and 'Objective Bayesian' views is in the domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement appears to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within weak psychologism).
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