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Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument

Ishtiyaque Haji
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), pp. 1-19
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40267463
Page Count: 19
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Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument
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Abstract

The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities - a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it - to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van In wagen's version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker's recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.

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