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On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009

Roger D. Congleton
Public Choice
Vol. 140, No. 3/4 (Sep., 2009), pp. 287-317
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40270924
Page Count: 31
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On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009
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Abstract

U.S. policies to promote home ownership and other banking regulatory decisions helped to create a highly leveraged international market for mortgage-based securities. Declines in the price of housing, consequently, had major effects on the balance sheets and portfolios of financial institutions throughout the world. The political response to the financial crisis has been rapid and large. In general, differences in the effectiveness of government policies show the advantage of standing institutions at crisis management relative to innovative legislation.

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