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Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale

Ken Aizawa
Synthese
Vol. 167, No. 3 (Apr., 2009), pp. 493-510
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40271218
Page Count: 18
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Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale
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Abstract

One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale's examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.

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