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Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction

Marcus P. Adams
Synthese
Vol. 170, No. 1 (Sep., 2009), pp. 97-114
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40271345
Page Count: 18
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Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction
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Abstract

In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8): 411- 444,2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.

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