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Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence
Vol. 71, No. 1, First Person Authority (Jul., 2009), pp. 19-34
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40272701
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Self knowledge, Introspection, Justified beliefs, Empirical evidence, Epistemic justification, Self ascriptions, Reliabilism, Intuition, Representationalism, Sensory perception
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The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form 'I am experiencing this' is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form 'I am experiencing a pain' occurs. This second self-ascription is justified inferentially, on the basis of the first, demonstrative thought. Thus, an account of introspective experiential self-knowledge can be developed which is richer and more adequate to the phenomena than pure reliabilism and Dretske's displaced perception model. There is really such a thing as introspection, but no inner sense.
Erkenntnis (1975-) © 2009 Springer