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Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 12, No. 4, Value Theory (Aug., 2009), pp. 413-428
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40284307
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Justified beliefs, Normativity, Deontology, Beauty, Truth, Epistemic justification, Consequentialism, Decision theory, Belief, Lotteries
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The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice © 2009 Springer