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A Propósito de "O Sentimento de Si": (Ou O Erro de Damásio)

Francisco Teixeira
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
T. 58, Fasc. 1, Fé e Razão & Outros Ensaios (Jan. - Mar., 2002), pp. 161-184
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40337677
Page Count: 24
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A Propósito de "O Sentimento de Si": (Ou O Erro de Damásio)
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Abstract

O Sentimento de Si, de António Damásio, tem como objectivo esclarecer não só o problema da construção da consciência mas também, e sobretudo, o problema da consciência da consciência, ou seja, da autoconsciência, do si. Para alcançar este desiderato Damásio constrói uma maioria de argumentos de base empírica e uns poucos de base lógico-filosófica, os quais o autor do artigo crê serem decisivos para a argumentação aí desenvolvida. O artigo pretende estabelecer, por um lado, o percurso dos principais argumentos lógico filosóficos de Damásio relativamente à emergência do si e, por outro, apresentar aquilo que julga serem as dificuldades desse percurso. Essas dificuldades prendem-se, sobretudo, com o erro do mentalismo, na medida em que se ignora tudo o que foi dito sobre o mentalismo pelo segundo Witt-genstein. Em alternativa ao mentalismo (quase) cartesiano de Damásio, o autor do artigo defende que a compreensão do si poderá ser melhor apreendida através do paradigma autopoiético de Humberto Maturana e Francisco Varela. /// The Feeling of What Happens (O Sentimento de Si) of António Damásio aims at illuminating not only the making of consciousness but also, and above all, the problem of the consciousness of consciousness, i. e., of self-consciousness or the self. In order to achieve this goal, Damásio builds up a majority of arguments with an empirical base and a few more with a logico-philosophical basis, that the author of the article believes to be decisive for the argument presented. The article aims at establishing, on the one hand, the way followed by the main logico-philosophical arguments of Damásio related to the emerging of the self and, on the other, at presenting what the author believes to be the main difficulty inherent to this way of proceeding. These difficulties have mainly to do with the error of mentalism as much as it seems to ignore what has been said on mentalism by the second Wittgenstein. In alternative to the (almost) cartesian mentalism of Damásio, the author of the article defends that the understanding of the self can better be captured by means of the autopoietic paradigm of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.

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