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A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation

Derk Pereboom
The Journal of Ethics
Vol. 12, No. 3/4, The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility (2008), pp. 287-306
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40345383
Page Count: 20
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A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation
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Abstract

A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I argue that conditions of both types are indispensable, and that they can be formulated so as to withstand the relevant objections.

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