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There Are Brute Necessities
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 60, No. 238 (Jan., 2010), pp. 149-159
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468282
Page Count: 11
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A necessarìly true sentence is 'brute' if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one. Cian Don has recently argued for far-reaching metaphysical claims on the basis of the principle that there are no brute necesdties: he initially argued that there are no non-symmetric relations, and later that there are no abstract objects at all. I argue that there are nominalisticalty acceptable brute necessities, and that Dorr's arguments thus fail. My argument is an application of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2010 Oxford University Press