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Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths
Vol. 173, No. 1, KNOWABILITY AND BEYOND (March 2010), pp. 107-122
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40586994
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Truth, Logical theorems, Verificationism, Paradoxes, Empirical knowledge, Religious freedom, Scientific method, Kantianism, Relevance logic, Idealism
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The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the noncontingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch's proof, which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch's premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance.
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