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Respect and Membership in the Moral Community

Carla Bagnoli
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 113-128
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40602518
Page Count: 16
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Respect and Membership in the Moral Community
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Abstract

Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for its governing role over other persons-regarding concepts.

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