Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

Journal Article

Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning

Byron J. Stoyles
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 195-207
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40602523
Page Count: 13
Were these topics helpful?
See something inaccurate? Let us know!

Select the topics that are inaccurate.

Cancel
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Add to My Lists
  • Cite this Item
Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry's (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255-270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia -knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway -and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle's account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry's interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance (sôphrosunê), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henry's account and this paper is intended to explain and resolve those.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[195]
    [195]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
196
    196
  • Thumbnail: Page 
197
    197
  • Thumbnail: Page 
198
    198
  • Thumbnail: Page 
199
    199
  • Thumbnail: Page 
200
    200
  • Thumbnail: Page 
201
    201
  • Thumbnail: Page 
202
    202
  • Thumbnail: Page 
203
    203
  • Thumbnail: Page 
204
    204
  • Thumbnail: Page 
205
    205
  • Thumbnail: Page 
206
    206
  • Thumbnail: Page 
207
    207