You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning
Byron J. Stoyles
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 195-207
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40602523
Page Count: 13
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Akrasia, Desire, Pleasure, Reasoning, Practical syllogisms, Morality, Syllogisms, Aristotelean ethics, Appetite, Self control
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry's (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255-270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia -knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway -and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle's account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry's interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance (sôphrosunê), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henry's account and this paper is intended to explain and resolve those.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice © 2007 Springer