You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES: A COMMENT
Martin Pesendorfer and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
Vol. 78, No. 2 (March, 2010), pp. 833-842
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40664496
Page Count: 10
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Fixed point property, Estimators, Difference equations, Consistent estimators, Keynesian cross, Estimation methods, Econometrics, Dynamic games, Observed choices
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). An example shows that the iterative method may not be consistent.
Econometrica © 2010 The Econometric Society