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The Effect of Disinterested Director Approval of Conflict Transactions Under the ALI Corporate Governance Project — A Practitioner's Perspective
John F. Johnston and Frederick H. Alexander
The Business Lawyer
Vol. 48, No. 4 (August 1993), pp. 1393-1405
Published by: American Bar Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40687431
Page Count: 13
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
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The policy perspective of the ALI Corporate Governance Project with respect to conflict of interest transactions that have been approved by disinterested directors is very different from that of many practitioners and, more importantly, from that of the courts that have decided the relevant cases. John F. Johnston and Frederick H. Alexander compare those perspectives in this Article.
The Business Lawyer © 1993 American Bar Association