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A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

Laszlo Goerke
Recherches Économiques de Louvain / Louvain Economic Review
Vol. 64, No. 2 (1998), pp. 225-236
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40724237
Page Count: 12
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure
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Abstract

Dans un modèle de « screening» à deux périodes décrivant les processus de grève, il est montré que des négociations centralisées plutôt qu'individuelles (par firmes) font baisser lés salaires et conduisent à plus de grèves. Ces résultats tiennent quelque soit l'acteur détenant l'information. La sensibilité des modèles de grève aux hypothèses quant aux procédures semble ainsi moins problématique que ce qu'on pourrait croire. For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

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