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ON THE GENERALIZATION OF NASH'S COOPERATIVE SOLUTION CONCEPT
Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1981), pp. 361-367
Published by: Akadémiai Kiadó
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40728859
Page Count: 7
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In the paper a general method is presented for the solution of cooperative games. Nash's solution concept for bimatrix games is generalized for the case of n-person games. In this paper we look for a Pareto-optimum satisfying an adequate axiom-system. It is shown in the paper that the axiom-system has exactly one solution and it is proved that this unique solution is equivalent to the solution of a nonlinear programming problem.
Acta Oeconomica © 1981 Akadémiai Kiadó