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Asset Specificity and Backward Integration

Michael H. Riordan
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
Vol. 146, No. 1, The New Institutional Economics Different Approaches to the Economics of Institutions (Mar. 1990), pp. 133-146
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751310
Page Count: 14
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Asset Specificity and Backward Integration
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Abstract

The principal-agent model of backward integration developed by Riordan [1989] is extended to allow assets to be partly redeploy able. Two issues are addressed. First, how does the sunkness of investments affect incentives to integrate backwards? Second, how does the ownership of control rights over asset redeployment matter? Das in Riordan [1989] entwickelte Prinzipal-Agent Modell der Integration zweier Unternehmen mit einer Lieferbeziehung wird verallgemeinert, indem eine partielle Verlagerung des in der Produktion eingesetzten Vermögens zugelassen wird. Es wird erstens der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Einfluß versunkene Investitionen auf den Anreiz zur Integration ausüben. Zum zweiten wird untersucht, welche Auswirkung die Zuweisung der Entscheidungsrechte über eine mögliche Verlagerung des eingesetzten Vermögens in der Produktion hat.

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