Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Endogenous Supervision

Jan Beyer Schmidt-Sørensen
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
Vol. 146, No. 4 (Dec. 1990), pp. 594-600
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751348
Page Count: 7
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($24.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Endogenous Supervision
Preview not available

Abstract

The basic efficiency-wage model is extended to include endogenously determined supervision. Work effort depends on wages, the number of workers and supervisors. It is e.g. shown that the Solow condition is relaxed for workers and a trade-off between wages ("self-supervision") and external supervision will not necessarily appear. Das grundlegende Effizienzlohnmodell wird erweitert, indem Überwachung endogenisiert wird. Der Arbeitseinsatz hängt annahmegemäß von den Löhnen sowie von der Zahl der Arbeiter und Aufseher ab. Es wird dann unter anderem gezeigt, daß die Solow-Bedingung aus der Sicht der Arbeiter abgeschwächt wird und daß es nicht notwendig einen trade-off zwischen Löhnen (bzw. „Selbstüberwachung”) und externer Überwachung gibt.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[594]
    [594]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
595
    595
  • Thumbnail: Page 
596
    596
  • Thumbnail: Page 
597
    597
  • Thumbnail: Page 
598
    598
  • Thumbnail: Page 
599
    599
  • Thumbnail: Page 
600
    600