Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

The Prisoners' Dilemma or the Jury's Dilemma? A Popular Story With a Dubious Name: Note

Håkan J. Holm
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
Vol. 151, No. 4 (Dec. 1995), pp. 699-702
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751850
Page Count: 4
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($24.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Prisoners' Dilemma or the Jury's Dilemma? A Popular Story With a Dubious Name: Note
Preview not available

Abstract

Institutional considerations reveal a fundamental logical problem in the story that was told to baptize the famous prisoners' dilemma game. The story presumes that a confession is of some value to a judge or jury in determining the guilt or innocence of two individuals. The problem is that the prisoners would confess even if they were innocent, a fact that can be taken advantage of by a rational prisoner.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[699]
    [699]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
700
    700
  • Thumbnail: Page 
701
    701
  • Thumbnail: Page 
702
    702