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Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games

Kevin A. McCabe, Stephen J. Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Vol. 93, No. 23 (Nov. 12, 1996), pp. 13421-13428
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40810
Page Count: 8
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games
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Abstract

We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.

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